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NEIGHBORHOOD, CRIME, AND
INCARCERATION
IN NEW YORK CITY

Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, and Jan Holland*

I. INTRODUCTION
Several new studies suggest that social and spatial
incarceration of young males has become part of the developmental
*
Jeffrey Fagan is Professor of Law and Public Health at Columbia
University. His research and scholarship focuses on crime, law, and social policy.
He is a Fellow of the American Society of Criminology, a member of the
MacArthur Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice,
and serves on the Committee on Law and Justice of the National Research
Council.
Valerie West is Research Scientist in the Center for Crime, Community,
and Law at Columbia Law School. Her recent research has centered on judicial
review and reversal of capital verdicts post-Furman, capital sentencing postFurman, differences in the growth of imprisonment in the 50 states, and the
community impact of incarceration in New York City.
Jan Holland is Staff Associate in the Center for Violence Research and
Prevention at the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University. She
is currently working on a study of the concentration and impact of incarceration
on NYC neighborhoods. Her other research includes a comparison of the impact of
juvenile versus criminal court sanctions on the recidivism of adolescent felony
offenders and an impact evaluation of HUD's Drug Elimination Program.
This research was supported by Grant 85-00-11 from the Russell Sage
Foundation, Future of Work Program. All opinions are solely those of the authors,
as are any errors. Additional support was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, Substance Abuse Policy Research Program. We are grateful to the
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the New York City Police
Department, and the New York City Department of Health for generously
supplying data for this research. Tamara Dumanovsky helped conceptualize and
launch the project, and supervised the assembly of the datasets. Excellent
research assistance was provided by Steven Glickman, Nicole Mutter, and
Carolyn Pinedo.
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ecology of adolescence in the nation's poorest neighborhoods. This
concentration began in the 1970s, and has grown steadily through
the last quarter century.' The story of young men such as Cesar in
Random Family illustrates the pervasive effects of both direct and
vicarious prison experiences for young men and women in poor
neighborhoods. 2 Studies of street life such as Random Family, Code
of the Streets, 3 and American Project4 show how these experiences are
now internalized in the social and psychological fabric of
neighborhood life, a constant reality in the background of childhood
socialization, and an everyday contingency for young men as they
navigate the transition from adolescence to adulthood. Some studies
show that within neighborhoods, incarceration leads to more
incarceration over time in a spiraling dynamic. 5 Other recent studies
show that the risks of going to jail or prison grow over time for
persons living in poor neighborhoods, contributing to the
accumulation of social and economic adversity for people living in
these areas, and depreciating the overall well being of the
6
neighborhood itself.
Accordingly, there are several reasons to consider
incarceration as part of an ecological dynamic of crime in
neighborhoods. High rates of incarceration can adversely affect the
ability of returning prisoners to re-enter labor markets, thus
aggravating social and economic disadvantages within areas where

1.
See Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of
Incarceration,47 Crime & Delinq. 410 (2001).
2.
Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, Random Family: Love, Drugs, Trouble, and
Coming of Age in the Bronx (2003) (following an extended family's interaction
with the criminal justice system).
3.
Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral
Life of the Inner City (1999) (studying interpersonal violence among inner-city

youth).

4.
Sudhir Aladi Venkatesh, American Project: The Rise and Fall of a
Modern Ghetto (2000) (discussing field research conducted in Chicago's Robert
Taylor Homes projects regarding life on the streets).

5.

See, e.g., Dina A. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration,Social Capital,

and Crime: Implications for Social DisorganizationTheory, 36 Criminology 441
(1998).

6.

See, e.g., James P. Lynch & William J. Sabol, Assessing the Effects of

Mass Incarcerationon Informal Social Control in Communities, 3 Criminology &
Pub. Pol'y 267 (2004).
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former inmates are concentrated.7 Incarceration may also disrupt
family ties and ties to conventional social networks, worsening
vulnerabilities to crime by compromising the social resources
available to returning inmates.8 Additionally, incarceration can
destabilize crime networks in neighborhoods, creating churning
effects that introduce the potential for violence between crime groups
competing for territory and market share in vacuums created by
aggressive police tactics. 9 High rates of incarceration may also reduce
incentives for law-abiding citizens to participate in informal social
control by reducing the communicative value of sanctions, delegitimizing law and legal actors, further inviting crime and
intensifying the crime-enforcement-incarceration-crime
cycle. 10
Incarceration
potentially
stigmatizes
entire
neighborhoods,
complicating the ability of residents to access job hiring networks and
to enter and compete in labor markets, as well as deterring
businesses from locating in those areas.
These dynamics suggest that incarceration is not simply a
consequence of neighborhood crime. Rather, high rates of
incarceration may be internalized as a part of the ecological dynamic
of neighborhoods, becoming part of a cycle that may actually elevate
crime within neighborhoods.

7.
Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration,
47 Crime & Delinq. 410, 424 (2001).
8.
John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of
Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners,in Prisons 121, 121-22
(Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999); Joan Moore, Bearing the Burden:
How IncarcerationPolicies Weaken Inner-City Communities, in The Unintended
Consequences of Incarceration 67, 72-75 (Vera Inst. of Justice ed., 1996). See
generally Invisible Punishment: Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
9.
See, e.g., Patrick J. Bayer et al., Building Criminal CapitalBehind Bars:
Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections (2004) (Yale University Economic Growth
Center Discussion Paper No. 864), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=441882.

10.
Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public
Cooperation with the Police and Courts 108-11 (2002); Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L.
Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment

in Minority Communities, in Punishment & Soc'y (forthcoming 2005); Robert J.
Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?)Tolerance
of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 Law & Soc'y Rev.
777, 799 (1998).
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Identifying and estimating these dynamics is the focus of this
article. The article illustrates this process using data from New York
City on neighborhood rates of incarceration in jail or prison in five
waves over a twelve-year period beginning in 1985. We show that
rates of incarceration grew slowly in the early 1980s, and spiked
sharply after 1985 as crime rates rose. Incarceration rates persisted
at a high level through the 1990s, declining far more slowly than did
the sharply falling crime rates. These analyses show that the use of
incarceration,
especially prison,
varies across
the City's
neighborhoods and police precincts, but that the overall excess of
incarceration rates over crime rates seems to be concentrated among
non-white males living in the City's poorest neighborhoods.
Thus, the first task of the article is to illustrate and explain
the growth of incarceration and estimate its effects. We show that
neighborhoods with high rates of incarceration invite closer police
surveillance, especially drug enforcement, contributing to the
growing number of repeat admissions and the resilience of
incarceration rates even as crime rates fall. We also show that
incarceration may contribute to increases in some crimes, a
counterintuitive empirical fact we find when we analyze
neighborhood change over time and control statistically for
neighborhood differences. Thus, we find that incarceration begets
more incarceration, and incarceration also begets more crime, which
in turn invites more aggressive enforcement, which then re-supplies
incarceration. It is, quite literally, a vicious cycle. The constant
rearrangement of social networks through removal and return of
prisoners becomes a routine part of neighborhood life and disrupts its
capacity for social control. In other words, incarceration creates a
supply of both crime and more incarceration.
Next, we discuss social, economic, legal, and political
mechanisms through which spatial concentration transforms a spike
in incarceration from an acute external shock into an enduring
internal feature of the neighborhood fabric, a dynamic process that
then persists regardless of law or policy, and well in excess of the
supply of criminals. When high incarceration rates are internalized
into the social ecology of small, homogeneous neighborhoods, it
adversely affects the economic fortunes, political participation, family
life, and normative orientation of people living in the social context of
imprisonment and its aftermath. We conclude with a discussion of
how this concentration distorts the relationships between citizens
and the law.
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Crime and Incarceration Trends Over Time

A.

Beginning in the 1980s, the prison population in the United
States increased sharply, and the population continued to rise
through 2002. The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S.
Department of Justice reports that the state prison population more
than doubled in the decade from 1980 to 1990, from 295,819 to
684,544.11 It continued to rise by nearly 50 percent from 1990 to
1995, to 989,004.12 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
overall incarceration in the United States rose 3.6 percent from 1995
to 2002, to 2,033,331 inmates in jails and prisons.' 3 The number of
inmates in state prisons rose 2.9 percent to 1,209,640 during this
time, and jail populations rose 4 percent to 665,475. Jail populations
rose 5.4 percent in 2002 alone. The total incarceration rate per
100,000 citizens in the United States rose from 601 in 1995 to 701 in
14
2002, an increase of 16.6 percent.
Incarceration rates in New York City and State followed
similar trends. New York State's prison population was 66,786
inmates in 2002, up from 55,000 in 1990 and 27,000 in 1985.15 Over
the past fifteen years, approximately 70 percent of the State's prison
inmates came from New York City.1 6 New York City's average daily
jail inmate population was 17,897 in 1999, only slightly lower than
the 1990 population of 19,643.17
Table 1 shows the dynamics of crime, enforcement,
prosecution, and sentencing that have contributed to incarceration
11.
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract
Program, at
Reporting
Corrections
ncrp92.htm (Sept. 2000) (compiling data, in spreadsheet format, on prisoners in
the custody of state and federal correctional authorities from 1977-98).
12.

See id.

13.

See Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2002, Bureau of

Justice Statistics Bulletin
bjs/pub/pdf/p02.pdf.
14.

2,

tbl.1

(July 2003),

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

Id.

New York State, Division of Criminal Justice Services, Selection for
15.
Criminal Justice Indicators, at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa
/areastat/areast.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Division of Criminal
Justice Services].
16.

Id.

See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarcerationin
17.
New York City Neighborhoods,30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1551, 1555 (2003).

76

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[36:71

Table 1. Crime, Arrest and Punishment
New York City, 1985-1997

1985

1990

1995

Change Change Change
1985- 1985- 19901997
1997
1997
1990

Reported Crime
Total Index Crimes
Violent Crimes
% Violent Crimes
Arrests
Felony Arrests
Felony Drug Arrests
% Felony Drug Arrests
Felony Arrests per
Index Crime
Misdemeanor Arrests
Misdemeanor Drug
Arrests
% Misdemeanor Drug
Arrests
Prosecution
Felony Prosecution -Indictments
Violent
% Violent Crime
Prosecutions
Drug
% Felony Drug
Prosecutions
Convictions
Convictions per 100
Felony Arrests

602,945 711,556 442,532 356,573
135,305 174,689 114,180 92,866
22.4
24.6
25.9
26

18.0
29.1
9.8

(40.9)
(31.4)
16.1

(49.9)
(46.8)
5.7

106,530 148,171 135,128 130,309
21,008 47,838 43,697 41,728
19.7
32.3
32.3
32

39.1
127.7
64.0

22.3
98.6
62.4

(12.1)
(12.8)
(0.9)

17.5

106.2

75.5

127,222 118,634 181,565 204,979

(6.8)

61.1

72.8

34,899

33,056

52,892

63,879

(5.3)

83.0

93.2

27.4

27.9

29.1

31.2

1.8

13.9

•11.8

30,416
15,745

54,837
19,714

42,758
13,064

37,041
11,239

80.3
25.2

21.8
(28.6)

(32.5)
(43.0)

51.8
7,702

36
27,071

30.6
22,377

30.3
18,964

(30.5)
251.5

(41.5)
146.2

(15.8)
(29.9)

25.3

49.4

52.3

51.2

95.3

102.4

3.6

6.2

35.8

27.8

(23.6)

11.0

45.4

0.177

0.208

0.305

0.365

150,080 159,411 175,203 203,797
140.88

107.58

129.66

156.39
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Table 1. Crime, Arrest and Punishment
New York City, 1985-1997 (continued)

Sentences
Prison
Jail
Jail + Probation
Incarceration Ratios
Prison Sentences per
100 Index Crimes
Prison Sentences per
100 Felony Prosecutions
Prison Sentences per
100 Convictions
Jail Sentences per 100
Misdemeanor Arrests

Change Change Change
1985- 1985- 19901990
1997
1997
22.6
23.8
1.0
89.0
52.7
(19.2)
6.8
15.6
8.3
121.3
96.1
(11.4)

1985
75,264
10,802
61,839
2,623

1990
92,261
20,420
66,035
5,806

1995
79,845
18,353
55,957
5,535

1997
93,141
16,490
71,508
5,143

1.79

2.86

4.15

4.62

59.8

158.1

61.5

35.5

37.2

42.9

44.5

4.8

25.4

19.6

7.2

12.8

10.5

8.8

77.8

22.2

(31.3)

50.7

60.6

33.9

37.4

19.5

(26.2)

(38.3)

growth beginning in 1985, the year before the onset of the crack
epidemic in New York, and continuing through 1997, when crime had
declined sharply in the City. Table 1 shows that the number and rate
of prison sentences (per arrest and per conviction) rose at a faster
pace than did crime from 1985 through 1990, and then declined far
more slowly than did crime from 1991 through 1997. Reported index
crimes, including violent felonies and major property crimes, rose by
nearly 18 percent from 1985 through 1990, but felony arrests rose by
nearly 40 percent and felony prosecutions grew by 80 percent in this
period.
Prosecutions rose, too, perhaps motivated by the increased
opportunities for incarceration created by legislation lowering the
thresholds for felony drug convictions18 and mandating prison

18.
See, e.g., Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 276, §§ 220.21, 220.42, 1973 N.Y. Laws
371, 380-81 (codified as amended in N.Y. Penal Law) (explaining that criminal
possession of two or more ounces of a controlled substance and criminal sale of
one or more ounces of a controlled substance are Class A-I felonies). The 1973 Act
distinguished between degrees of possession and sale by weight of the prohibited
substance. This was a departure from previous laws that classified only certain
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sentences for "predicate" felony offenders with prior felony
convictions. 19 Convictions, however, rose far more slowly, increasing
by less than 10 percent. Even while convictions remained relatively
stable, prison sentences nearly doubled during that time, from 10,802
to 20,420. Jail sentences remained stable, a reflection of the stable
rate of misdemeanor arrests during this time. It appears, then, that
the legislature's narrowing of sentencing discretion accounted for the
growth in imprisonment during this time, with prison sentences
growing at a faster rate than the crime rate, the felony arrest rate,
and the rate of convictions.
The effects of the predicate felony laws also resulted in
increases in the percentage of new prison admissions who had served
prior prison terms. Our analyses show that the percent of new
admissions with prior arrests, prior convictions, and prior jail
sentences rose slightly from 1985 to 1996.20 For example, Table 2
shows that 48 percent of the prison admissions in 1985 had prior jail
sentences; by 1996, 55 percent had prior jail sentences. The largest
increase was in admissions with prior prison sentences. In 1985, 26

drugs such as heroin, morphine, and cocaine into degrees, which were
differentiated by the quantity of the preparation, compound, mixture, or
substance containing the drug. Under this system, drug offenses are graded
according to the dangerousness and the quantity of the drug involved.
Dangerousness of a drug is determined by consulting detailed schedules of
controlled substances, with the drugs considered most harmful listed in schedule
I, and those classified as the least harmful in schedule V. The 1973 Act made it a
felony to possess or sell a specified amount of a broader variety of drugs. Thus,
three categories of drug possession and three categories of sale required
mandatory imprisonment carrying minimum ranges of one year to life (A-III), six
years to life (A-II), or fifteen years to life (A-I). See generally Susan N. Herman,
Measuring Culpability by Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to Re-evaluate the
Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 777, 788 (2000) (discussing the grading of
drug sentences based on the dangerousness and quantity of the given drug).
19.
See infra notes 28-29. See generally Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the
Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City,
and the Legalization Debate, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 795, 821 (1990) (discussing how
street-level drug enforcement tactics plus harsh predicate felon laws have
increased the number of individuals in New York City who face mandatory
incarceration for narcotics offenses); Lisa R. Nakdai, Note, Are New York's
Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for the Sake of the Message?, 30
Hofstra L. Rev. 557, 560 (2001) (categorizing the Rockefeller drug laws as leading
to increased drug felonies and largely contributing to the growth of New York's
prison population).
20.
See infra Part III.

20041
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percent of the new admissions to prison had served prior prison
sentences; by 1993, the proportion had risen to 38 percent, and then
to 39 percent in 1996. Thus, over time, the prison admissions
increasingly were drawn from the ranks of previously incarcerated
individuals. This recycling of prisoners was a driving force in
maintaining high prison populations even in an era of sharply
declining crime rates.
Table 2. Proportion of Prison Admissions by Prior Criminal
Justice Involvement, 1985-96
Prior Jail

Prior Prison
Sentences

Year

Prior Arrests

Prior
Convictions

1985

.77

.67

.48

.26

1987

.77

.68

.51

.24

1990

.78

.68

.53

.26

1993

.80

.71

.55

.38

1996

.80

.72

.55

.39

Sentences

Source: Source: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 20% Sample of
Prison Admissions over Five Waves, 1985-96

Several features of drug law and policy contributed to the
disproportionate share of drug offenders among new prison
admissions, illustrated in Figure 1. First, New York implemented a
series of intensive street-level enforcement initiatives during this
time, each focusing on aggressive buy-and-bust tactics to snare drug
sellers and some buyers. One such initiative was Operation Pressure
Point, launched in the mid-1980s, 21 another was the Tactical Narcotic
Teams (TNT).22 These and similar tactics, including a dramatic
expansion of the police department's Narcotics Division, produced a
nearly 50 percent increase in drug arrests from 1985-1990.23 By 1997,

21.

See Lynn Zimmer, Operation Pressure Point (1987).

See generally Michele Sviridoff et al., The Vera Institute for Justice, The
22.
Neighborhood Effects of Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Tactical Narcotics
Teams in New York (1992) (researching the efforts and impact of the Tactical
Narcotics Teams in Brooklyn, New York).
See Division of Criminal Justice Services, supra note 15 (demonstrating
23.
that felony and misdemeanor drug arrests in New York city increased from
55,906 in 1985 to 80,896 in 1990). See generally Letwin, supra note 19, at 803
n.56 (discussing the increase in citywide drug arrests between 1987 and 1990).
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drug arrests had declined by 12.8 percent from the 1990 peak, but
remained over 98 percent higher than the 1985 levels. 24 Second,
programs such as Operation Condor, launched in 1999, sustained the
high rates of drug arrests even as non-drug crime was falling
sharply. Operation Condor used overtime pay to motivate police
officers to use both buy-and-bust tactics and reverse stings to make
tens of thousands of drug arrests across the City.25 However, these
Figure 1. Percent of Prison Admissions by Offense Type
New York City, 1985-199626
50

40

30DrgSl

"40ePoprtenim

P--t
20

ro
10

_______

01
1985

1987

1990

1993

1996

Year

strategies raised complaints from minority citizens about the racial
disproportionality of drug law enforcement and the excessive use of a
full criminal justice process (including the use of pretrial detention
rather than summons) for low-level drug offenders, whose crimes
were mostly non-violent and who posed a minimal threat to public
safety.27 Third, drug sentencing laws were again amended during
24.
See Division of Criminal Justice Services, supra note 15; see also Fagan,
supra note 17, at 1558 tbl.1.
25.
William Rashbaum, Police Suspend Extra Patrols for 10 Days, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 2000, at B1.
26
New York State, Division of Criminal Justice Services, 20% Sample of
Prison Admissions, various years.
27.

See, e.g., Christopher Ketcham, Roach Motel, at http://archive.salon.com

/mwt/feature/2002/10/17/jail-time/index.html
(Oct. 17, 2002); Civil Rights
Bureau, Office of the Attorney Generan of the State of New York, The New York
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this time to mandate longer sentences for possession of even small
amounts of cocaine. Specifically, by 1988, the New York State
Legislature had enacted broad changes in sentencing for many drug
offenses, including mandatory incarceration and lengthened
sentences for even small amounts of drugs. 28 Predicate felony laws
also contributed to the rise in imprisonment by mandating prison
29
sentences for felony offenders with any prior felony conviction.
City Police Department's "Stop-and-Frisk" Practices: A Report to the People of the
State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General (1999), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop-friskstopfrisk.html (last visited
Dec. 9, 2004).
See N.Y. Penal Law § 220 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2004). The
28.
comments to section 220 of New York's penal laws note that:
With respect to cocaine, in 1988, "criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the fifth degree" was amended to add the
knowing and unlawful possession of "five hundred milligrams or
more of cocaine" [L. 1988, c. 178; Penal Law § 220.05(5)]. The
purpose of the amendment was to take into account the widelyused form of cocaine known as "crack." Crack is a concentrated
form of cocaine which is exceptionally potent and addictive. The
desired effect from the use of the crack may be obtained by the use
of a substantially smaller quantity than would be required to
obtain the same effect from the traditional form of cocaine. Thus,
crack is generally sold to users in vials containing a small quantity
of the drug. To the extent the distinction between misdemeanor
and felony possession rests philosophically on a distinction between
minor use, and either significant use or the likelihood that the
possessor was selling or sharing the drug, the aggregate weight
standard for cocaine was deemed unrealistically high as the
threshold for liability for felony possession of crack. Thus, criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, a class D
felony, was amended to encompass the possession of 500
milligrams or more of cocaine.
In part because of the chemical properties of crack, and because of a growing
belief that liability for possession of a controlled substance should be based solely
on the quantity of the drug possessed, liability for the possession of the 500
milligrams of cocaine is premised on the "pure" or actual weight of the drug, not
the aggregate weight of the substance containing the drug. The remaining crimes
of criminal possession and sale of cocaine, however, utilize the aggregate
standard [see and compare Penal Law §§ 220.06(5); 220.09(1); 220.16(12);
220.18(1); 220.21(1)].
N.Y. Penal Law § 220 practice cmt. (McKinney 2000).
29.
See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 70.06, .10 (McKinney 2004) (authorizing
increased sentencing for repeat felony offenders). Although these laws were
enacted prior to the 1980s, their existence, in conjunction with increased drug
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Coming on top of the already harsh, deterministic Rockefeller Drug
Laws, 30 the predicate felony statutes in practice elevated the prison
population by denying judicial discretion in sentencing repeat
offenders, thus indexing the incarceration rate to the arrest rate.
The effects of the predicate felony statutes landed most heavily on
both drug offenders and violent offenders. The intersection of drug
sentencing laws and drug enforcement policies, fueled by calls for
ever tougher enforcement against drug dealers, was the engine
behind New York's historic expansion of its prison population from
31
1985-1997.
This Study

B.

In this article, we assess the dynamics that contributed to the
differential growth and concentration of incarceration within
neighborhoods over time. Incarceration affects neighborhoods by both
removing and returning individuals to the community. In some
neighborhoods, it is not uncommon for certain residents to cycle
between the jail or prison systems and their communities several
times within a period of a few years. Their constant exit and return
creates a churning effect that disrupts networks of social control,
increasing the neighborhood's vulnerability to crime. Accordingly, we
show the reciprocal effects of crime and incarceration over time,
estimate the effects of factors such as drug enforcement that produce
the supply of persons for incarceration, and estimate whether
incarceration rates reflect or exceed what we might expect from the
local crime rate. We also ask how drug enforcement interacts with
neighborhood social ecology, in order to assess whether these
dynamics are more pronounced under conditions of social and
economic disadvantage.
We examine the impact of incarceration on crime and
subsequent incarceration at two levels of aggregation: police precinct
and neighborhood. Neighborhood is important in the social regulation

enforcement and heightened penalties for drug crimes, contributed to the increase
in incarceration during the 1980s. Prior felony convictions which resulted in a
suspended sentence, a probation sentence, a sentence of conditional or
unconditional discharge, or any other sentence, were considered eligible for
predicate felony sentencing upon a second felony conviction.
30.

See statutes cited supra note 18.

31.

See Table 1 supra and Table 4, infra.
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of both legal and illegal behavior, 32 and also because it is the locus at
which criminogenic factors exert their influence on the everyday lives
of neighborhood residents. 33 Police precinct also is relevant and
important because the social organization of law enforcement
functions at this level, policies are implemented and managed within
precincts, and citizens interact with police assigned to specific
precincts.
II. RESEARCH METHODS
We constructed a time series of incarceration and crime in
New York City for the period from 1985 to 1996. We obtained a 20
percent sample of all individuals sentenced to prison and a 5 percent
sample of all jail sentences for cases with dispositions in New York
City for the years 1985, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996. For each of these
years, this procedure yielded samples of 2,000 to 4,000 individuals
who received prison sentences, and samples of 3,000 to 4,000
individuals who received jail sentences.
The addresses of persons admitted to prisons or jails were
geo-coded into three hierarchical spatial units: police precinct,
neighborhood, and census tract. There are 75 police precincts in New
York City, 295 neighborhoods, and approximately 2200 census tracts.
The neighborhood boundaries were drawn from a schema developed
by Kenneth L. Jackson and John Manbeck, who defined
neighborhoods based on interviews with local residents and physical
examination of naturally occurring neighborhood boundaries. 34 These
32.
See generally Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent
Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Sci. 918 (1997) (showing that
social interactions that promote close ties among neighbors also inhibit crimes
within neighborhoods by encouraging citizens to actively sanction crimes that
they observe, and cooperate with police); Sampson & Bartusch, supra note 10
(showing that when citizens view the law and legal actors as responsive, fair and
legitimate, they are more likely to engage in social control activities that can
reduce crime).
33.
See generally Ralph B. Taylor & Jeanette Covington, Neighborhood
Changes in Ecology and Violence, 26 Criminology 553 (1988) (showing that crime
rates vary across small neighborhoods consisting of only a few blocks).
34.
See Kenneth L. Jackson & John Manbeck, The Neighborhoods of
Brooklyn (1998). Boundaries for each neighborhood are shown in each chapter.

Computerized census boundary maps are also available at New York City,
Department of City Planning, Population Division downloadable data,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/neighbor/neigh.html

(last visited Nov. 4, 2004). See
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neighborhood units thus reflect small areas where local social and
economic contexts are influential both on social control and crime
opportunities. After eliminating areas with no population, such as
parks and heavily industrialized areas, the final number of
neighborhood units was 274.
Measures of crime were then constructed for both
neighborhoods and precincts, to estimate the supply of individuals
available for incarceration, and also to serve as contextual factors
that moderate the relationship between neighborhood and
incarceration. Measures of crime include felony arrests at the level of
police precincts and injury assaults and homicides at both the
precinct and neighborhood
levels.
Unfortunately,
spatially
disaggregated data on a broader range of felony crimes and arrests in
smaller units such as neighborhoods were not available from the
police department in New York City until 1994. Accordingly, we
relied on homicide fatalities, obtained from the New York City
Department of Health, to estimate overall crime rates in
neighborhoods.
To address the specific and theoretically significant
contribution of drug enforcement on incarceration, we constructed a
time series on drug arrests as a measure of the intensity of drug
enforcement. This time series was created by obtaining a 10 percent
sample of drug arrests from 1985 to 1996 from the New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services. 35 Each arrest record was then
geo-coded to geographical coordinates for assignment to census tract,
neighborhood, and police precinct.
We also included in these models measures of the social and
economic makeup of each precinct and neighborhood. This allowed us
to estimate both the effects of incarceration on crime and then crime
on incarceration, net of the effects of social and economic factors that
may be associated with crime itself, and adjusted for the prior year's

generally http://www.infoshare.org

(last visited

Nov.

4,

2004)

(providing

demographic profiles of areas that may be defined by various measures, including
census tract, neighborhood, and police precinct).
35.
See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, The Effects of Drug Enforcement on
the Rise and Fall of Homicides in New York City, 1985-95 (2002) (final report on
Grant No. 031675 to the Substance Abuse Policy Research Program, Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation) [hereinafter Fagan, Drug Enforcement], available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/Drug-Enforcement andHomicdeDrugEnf
orcement-andHomicide.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2004).
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crime and incarceration rates. In other words, these models allowed
us to test whether incarceration was a function of the supply of
criminals, or if it was influenced by other factors unrelated to crime.
Table 3 summarizes the data sources and measures used to
construct indicia of neighborhood social organization. 36 The
dimensions of social organization and social ecology reflect an
integration of several theories of crime between cities and within
neighborhoods in cities.3 7 We developed the social structural
indicators of neighborhoods from 1990 census data, since 1990 is the
mid-point of the time series for analysis of incarceration trends, and
treat these factors as fixed effects when analyzing incarceration
trends and effects. Variables were computed at the census tract level,
and then aggregated or recomputed for both the neighborhood and
police precinct boundaries. We then used principle components factor
analyses to reduce multiple indicators of neighborhoods to a set of
38
predictors consistent with theory.
36.
Additional information on data sources and measures is available from
the
authors
at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/papers/CHRLRNeighborhoodIncarceration/Tables-andFigures.doc (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
37.
See, e.g., Eric Baumer, Poverty, Crack, and Crime: A Cross-City Analysis,
31 J. Res. in Crime & Delinq. 311 (1994); Graham C. Ousey & Matthew R. Lee,
Examining the Conditional Nature of the Illicit Drug Market-Homicide
Relationship, 40 Criminology 73 (2002). See generally Robert J. Bursik, Jr. &
Harold G. Grasmick, Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective
Community Control (1993) (constructing and validating a theory of social control
that integrates public, private, and parochial influences on social behavior and
social development of adolescents during their peak years of risk for criminal
activity); Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, The Structural Context of
Homicide: Accounting for Racial Differences in Process, 65 Am. Soc. Rev. 547
(2000) (showing that homicide rates are highest in cities where the concentration
of economic deprivation and social disadvantage are most acute); Robert J.
Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime, supra note 32; Robert J.
Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime and Urban
Inequality, in Crime and Inequality 37 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds.,
1995) (showing that neighborhoods' capacity for social control is influenced by
their political economy, which in turn reflects racially disproportionate patterns
of economic and social resources); Ralph B. Taylor & Jeanette Covington,
Neighborhood Changes in Ecology and Violence, 26 Criminology 553 (1988)
(showing that poor neighborhoods have higher crime rates when they are
adjacent to rapidly developing and improving neighborhoods).
38.
The factor scores, means, standard deviations, and zero-order
correlation matrices for both neighborhoods and precincts are available from the
authors at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/papers/CHRLRNeighborhoodIncarceration/Tables-andFigures.doc (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
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Table 3. Data Domains and Sources
Variable

Data Source

Description

Jail and Prison

New York State

5% Sample ofjail admissions, 20% sample of

Admissions

Division of

prison admissions, five periods from 1985-96.

Criminal Justice Defendant residential address geocoded to census
Services,

tract, neighborhood and police precinct

TRENDS file
Drug Arrests

New York State

10% Sample of felony drug arrestees from 1985-96,

Division of

charged with any of five drug charges: sale or

Criminal Justice possession of controlled substances, sale or
Services,
TRENDS file

possession of marijuana, or possession of drug
paraphernalia. Defendant residential address
geocoded to census tract, neighborhood and police
precinct

Homicide

New York City

Case level data from Vital Statistics records on

Victimization

Department of

homicide victimizations from 1985-96. Place of

Rate

Health, Vital

residence recorded, and geocoded to census tract,

Statistics

police precinct, or neighborhood.

New York City

UCR felony complaints by type of crime by

Felony

Complaint Rates Police

precinct, 1985-97

Department,
Office of
Management,
Analysis and
Planning
New York City Department of City Planning

Population,

New York City

Housing and

Department of

Population Division downloadable data,

Economic

City Planning

http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popdiv.h
tml; Also, http:J/www.infoshare.org, New York City

Variables

files
Population and

1990 Census

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Summery Tape File

Social

Data

3A.

Characteristics
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Finally, endogeneity is a common issue in panel data, as a
reflection of the propensities of neighborhoods or individuals that
contribute to their differences in the measures of interest at the
outset of the time series. Endogeneity reflects the fact that many
processes, such as crime and punishment, are the result of reciprocal,
mutual, or reverse causation over time. 39 Both neighborhoods and
precincts varied at the outset of the study period in their rates of
incarceration and crime, and the trajectories of neighborhoods were
obviously influenced by their starting points. Failing to account for
these propensities would bias estimates of the effects of incarceration
over time. Accordingly, an initial analytic step was to develop
parameters that would account for these differences and to control for
such differences in explaining trajectories of incarceration over time.
We used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models on the
baseline (1985) panel to estimate the incarceration propensities of
neighborhoods and precincts based on their crime and social
structural indicators, and included these propensities in later models
of the effects of incarceration over time. 40 We used the standardized
residuals from these models as the measure of incarceration
propensity, and included the residuals in the subsequent analyses.
We also included interactions of each predictor by time to further
41
specify the role of time in the series.
Next, we pooled the data over time and across spatial units to
establish neighborhood-year and precinct-year data points. Pooling
the data for each aggregation unit across years has the advantage of
increasing the sample size for each model to N(T-1) cases, where N
represents the total number of neighborhoods (or precincts) and T
represents the number of years of data in the model. With N=75
police precincts, pooling the data over years greatly increases the
sample size. This method assumes, however, that the variance over
39.
See John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1423 (1998); Edward Glaeser, An Overview of Crime and
Punishment, in The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence, The World
Bank Group, at http'//www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/crimexl.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
40.
For a description of the relevant regression models, see Eric Hanushek
et al., Statistical Methods for Social Scientists (1977); William Greene,
Econometric Analysis (5th ed. 2003).
This data is available from the authors at http://www2.law.columbia.
41.
(last
edulfaganlpapers/CHRLRNeighborsIncarcerationlTables-andFigures.doc
visited Dec. 1, 2004).
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the pool, in this case across waves, is constant for the incarceration
rates in each neighborhood. This is likely not the case here. In order
to account for variation over time, we treat time as both a fixed effect
for each year to represent the variance unique to each cross-section,
or year, and also as a random effect to estimate specific year-by-year
changes. We used an autoregressive covariance structure to account
for the yearly serial correlation in both crime and incarceration.
We estimated multivariate models to assess the effects of
incarceration on crime and subsequent incarceration over a twelveyear period beginning in 1985. To determine whether there is a
statistically significant trend in incarceration, after controlling for
crime, arrests, and neighborhood social structure, we estimated
models of the number of incarceration sentences in each
neighborhood or precinct using Poisson regression models. Poisson
regressions generally are appropriate for identifying the number of
42
occurrences of a discrete event within a specific observation period.
These models try to predict why these events occur in some locales or
to some persons and not others, and how often they occur if they
occur at least once. These models offer a better understanding of how
crime contributed to the stability or growth in incarceration. If
incarceration rises and falls in a metric animated by crime rates, we
would expect that incarceration rates would be predicted by crime
rates, net of arrests. That is, arrests should rise and fall with crime,
and the effects of arrest on incarceration after controlling for crime
rates would not be statistically significant. If arrests predict
incarceration after controlling for crime, we might conclude that
enforcement at some tipping point becomes an endogenous process
that intensifies punishment beyond what we would predict from the
crime rate. In this dynamic, law enforcement produces the supply of
persons for incarceration in a process independent of crime.
Incarceration thus is grown from within, not imposed from the
outside.

42.
See, e.g., William Greene, Econometric Analysis (5th ed. 2000); Peter
Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics (1995).

20041

NEIGHBORHOOD AND INCARCERATION

89

III. RESULTS

A.

The Growth of Incarceration and Crime

Figures 2a-2c and 3a-3c, printed in the appendix to this
article, show the growth of incarceration over time for police
precincts and neighborhoods. 43 Both sets of maps show that
incarceration rates spread outward from a small number of precincts
or neighborhoods from 1985 to 1990. The rates also intensified in the
areas with the highest incarceration rates five years earlier. By 1996,
when crime rates had generally declined across neighborhoods and
police precincts in the City, incarceration remained very high in most
of the areas where it was highest in 1990, and declined only slightly
in a few others. There were virtually no places that had high
incarceration rates in 1990 that became low incarceration areas by
1996. In some areas, such as southeastern Queens and the
Washington Heights area in the northwest part of Manhattan,
incarceration rates rose during this period of general crime decline,
even as crime rates in these areas fell. Overall, both sets of figures
show the stability of incarceration from 1990 to 1996, at the same
time that felony crimes had declined by nearly 50%.
B.

Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration

A story describing the reciprocal effects of crime and
incarceration can be told from Tables 5 through 8. The first two
analyses estimate the effects of crime on incarceration over time,
controlling for neighborhood social structure and drug enforcement.
We included models predicting both jail and prison rates, and
included jail incarcerations (lagged by one year) as an additional
predictor of prison incarceration over time. As mentioned in the
methods section, each model also includes the residuals, or the area's
propensity for incarceration, at the outset of the time series. The
second two models estimate the effects of incarceration on crime,
controlling for both social structure and police enforcement.

43.
Figures 2 and 3 are also available from the authors in color format and
arranged for comparative viewing. See http://www2.1aw.columbia.edu/fagan/
papers/CHRLRNeighborhoodIncarceration/Tables-andFigures.doc (last visited
Dec. 1, 2004).
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Table 5. Poisson Regression of Incarceration
by Precinct Crime and Social Structure,
New York City, 1985-1996
Estimate
Intercept
Time
Residual (1985)
Jail One Year Lag
(Log) Felony Complaint Rate*
(Log) Homicide Rate
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Segregation
Social Control I
Housing Structure
Social Control I1
Immigration/Cultural Isolation
Human Capital II

Jail
t
p(t)

-13.798
0.068
1.703

-2.29
1.03
3.61

2.185
-3.751
1.225
0.2891
0.303
0.660
-0.251
-0.315
-0.047
0.824

1.72
-0.70
1.03
0.12
0.39
0.60
-0.18
-0.40
-0.06
0.52

-0.017

-3.24

-0.021
0.046
-0.008
0.001
-0.002
-0.009
0.004
0.003
-0.002
-0.008

-1.48
0.79
-0.60
0.03
-0.21
-0.75
0.28
0.37
-0.19
-0.45

Interactions with Time
Residual (1985)
Jail One Year Lag
(Log) Felony Complaint Rate*
(Log) Homicide Rate
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Segregation
Social Control 1
Housing Structure
Social Control H
Immigration/Cultural Isolation
Human Capital II
2 Log Likelihood
N=296
a = p<001, b = p<.01, c = p<.05
* per 1000 population 15 and above

256.6

a

Estimate

0.000
1.070
5.492

-13.840
0.0538
0.760
-0.001
2.749
0.594
-1.967
-1.940
1.392
3.676
-1.350
-0.836
-0.118
-0.771

-1.97
0.70
2.06
-0.98
1.95
0.12
-1.74
-0.85
1.98
3.63
-1.03
-1.07
-0.16
-0.49

-0.008
0.1E4
-0.026
-0.004
0.061
0.025
-0.013
-0.037
0.013
0.009
0.001
0.010

-1.91
1.09
-1.70
-0.08
2.10
1.02
-1.65
-3.37
0.89
1.02
0.16
0.59

4.548
0.024
3.404
1.335
1.353
1.935
0.778
0.730
0.954
2.279

a

Prison
t
p(t)

Exp(B)

0.983
0.979
1.048
0.992
1.000
0.998
0.991
1.004
1.003
0.998
0.992

261.5

c
c

c
c

c

a

Exp(B)
0.000
1.055
2.139
0.999
6.723
1.811
0.140
0.144
4.024
39.467
0.259
0.434
0.890
0.463

0.992
1.000
0.974
0.996
1.027
1.026
0.987
0.964
1.013
1.009
1.001
1.010
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In these four models, we test not only for differences between
precincts or neighborhoods over time, but also for differences in
trajectories of incarceration or crime within these areas over time.
The latter is the central focus of the analysis: whether incarceration
grows or slows over time, and what factors predict those changes. We
identify these effects by examining the parameter estimates for the
interactions of time with each predictor, which are shown in the
lower half of each table. Accordingly, we estimate whether the growth
in incarceration exceeds what would be expected from the "supply" of
offenders, or whether there are other factors that are contributing to
incarceration dynamics. That is, a significant interaction of time with
incarceration would indicate a meaningful effect of incarceration on
crime rates; the direction of the effect is determined from the sign of
the coefficient, 44 and the size of the effect is estimated from the
exponentiated coefficient. Similarly, in Tables 7 and 8, we estimate
the extent to which incarceration contributes over time to increases
or declines in crime.
Social and Legal Sources of Incarceration
Precincts. Table 5 shows the results for models of precinctlevel effects. Jail and prison share no predictors, neither in
differences between precincts (the upper portion of each table), or in
changes over time within precincts (the lower portion). Also, jail
incarceration rates do not predict prison incarcerations.
The jail models show that neither crime nor social structure
predicts jail admission rates in police precincts. The absence of
significant predictors might suggest that the use of jail may be a
random process that is unaffected by crime, social structure, or law
enforcement. Jail might also be explained by factors other than those
estimated in these models, unmeasured variables such as rates of
"disorder" crimes.
In contrast, prison admissions are predicted by both crime
and social structure. The felony crime rates predict variation between
precincts in prison admission rates, as do two social structural
factors: segregation and the first of the two social control factors. It is
no surprise that prison admission rates are higher in police precincts

For example, a negative sign for a regression coefficient means that an
44.
increase in the value of the variable predicts a lower crime rate, and a positive
coefficient means that an increase in the value of the variable would predict an
increase in crime.

92

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[36:71

Table 6. Poisson Regression of Incarceration
by Neighborhood Crime and Social Structure,
New York City, 1985-1996
Estimate
Intercept
Time
Residual (1985)
Jail Lagged One Year
(Log) Homicide Rate
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Social Control 1
Segregation
Housing Structure
Social Control II
Immigration/Cultural Isolation
Human Capital I
Interactions with Time
Residual (1985)
Jail Lagged One Year
(Log)Homicide Rate
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Social Control I
Segregation
Housing Structure
Social Control 11
Immigration/Cultural Isolation
Human Capital I1
2 Log Likelihood
N=1096

-4.014
-0.025
2.445

-1.26
-0.72
4..15

-4.589
1.314
3.531
-0.570
0.153
-0.929
-0.163
0.362
2.225

-1.12
1.46
2.00
-0.65
0.17
-0.67
-0.47
0.63
1.80

-0.024

-3.78

0.052
-0.010
-0.031
0.004
0.001
0.011
0.002
-0.006
-0.021

1.17
-0.99
-1.59
0.47
0.12
0.72
0.45
-0.92
-1.56

2807.0

a = p<001, b = p<.01, c = p<.05
* per 1000 population 15 and above

Jail
t
p(t) Exp(B)

a

c

a

0.18
0.975
11.524
0.010
3.721
34.144
0.566
1.166
0.395
0.850
1.436
9.253

0.976
1.053
0.990
0.970
1.005
1.001
1.011
1.001
0.994
0.979

Estimate

Prison
t
p(t)

-1.329
-0.066
1.674
-0.002
1.977
-2.151
0.420
1.526
2.101
-1.078
-0.148
-0.608
0.0823

-0.34
-1.56
3.60
-2.29
0.56
-2.85
0.28
1.95
2.85
-0.99
-0.42
-1.28
0.08

-0.0168
0.2E4
-0.021
0.028
0.1E3
-0.014
-0.019
0.010
0.001
0.006
0.013

-3.31
2.53
-0.54
3.33
0.01
-1.66
-2.34
0.83
0.23
1.24
0.11

2333.0

a
c
b
c
b

a
b
a
c

Exp(B)
0.265
0.936
5.332
0.998
7.221
0.116
1.522
4.601
8.174
0.340
0.862
0.545
1.085

0.983
1.000
0.979
1.028
1.000
0.986
0.981
1.010
1.001
1.006
1.001
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that have higher crime rates and are more racially segregated, and
also in areas where social control (of children and teenagers) is
weaker.
However, changes over time in prison admissions within
precincts suggest that incarceration is unaffected by the crime rate,
and instead is influenced by drug enforcement. The drug arrest rate
is a significant predictor of incarceration over time, contributing to
prison admissions beyond what would be predicted by the crime rate
alone. Neither the crime rate, the homicide rate, nor the jail
admission rate predicts the increase over time in incarceration within
precincts.
Neighborhoods. The results in Table 6 for the neighborhood
models show similar but not identical results. Variations between
neighborhoods in jail admissions are predicted only by poverty and
inequality-poorer neighborhoods have higher jail admission rates.
None of the predictors explain changes in jail admission rates over
time.
For neighborhoods, prison admissions are predicted by the
jail admission rate and the drug arrest rate. Unlike the precinct
analysis, here we find that the jail admission rate is tied to the
imprisonment rate at this spatially smaller and more socially
homogeneous unit of resolution. In this model, the drug arrest rate
predicts lower incarceration rates. Neighborhoods with lower drug
arrest rates have higher imprisonment rates, controlling for
differences in their rates at the outset of the time series. This finding
may be an artifact of measurement limitations or omitted variables,
especially the absence in this model of a measure of the crime rate or
45
measures of other types of arrest.
Once again, we find that drug arrests affect the trajectory of
prison admissions within neighborhoods, and again this relationship
is independent of the crime (homicide) rate. Drug arrests have a
significant positive effect on prison admissions, contributing to new
admissions even as the homicide rate within neighborhoods has
fallen over time. Here, the jail admission rate also contributes to the
prison admission rate. Since jail is a proxy for aggressive
misdemeanor enforcement, 46 jail admissions in this context may
45.
Recall that for neighborhoods, disaggregated crime complaint rates were
not available until 1994.
46.

Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, DeterrentEffects of the Police on
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serve as a proxy for overall law enforcement, consistent with the
47
City's strategy of order maintenance policing.
Summary. These models converge to tell a story of the
persistent application of drug enforcement to produce consistently
elevated rates of prison admissions, well above what might be
expected given the overall decline in crime and homicide since 1993.
Neighborhoods that are more racially segregated and that have
weaker forms of social control are more likely to have higher
incarceration rates over time, and are also the places where drug
enforcement and order maintenance policing strategies are most
likely to be aggressively pursued. 48 The convergence of findings in
these two analyses at different units of social and spatial resolution
lends confidence to these findings.
Effects of Incarcerationon Crime
Precincts. Here we examine the influence of incarceration
rates on crime. Table 7 shows that both jail and prison admission
rates are higher in precincts with more crime, even when lagged off
by one period. This is not surprising, since enforcement is likely to be
targeted in areas where crime rates generally are elevated. Crime
rates also are higher in precincts with lower rates of drug arrests.
Over time, we observe two contradictory trends. First, in both the jail
and prison models, higher incarceration predicts lower crime rates.
Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 163, 169
(1988).
47.

See George Kelling & Susan Cole, Fixing Broken Windows (1996); Eli

Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing 153-54 (1999);
Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race
and Disorder in New York City, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 457 (2000) [hereinafter
Fagan, Street Stops]. See generally Judith Greene, Zero-Tolerance:A Case Study
of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 Crime & Delinq. 171, 173

(1999) (noting that Bratton "introduced new management tools, techniques, and
technology at lightning speed and moved quickly to decentralize authority and to
wrest decision-making power away from headquarters brass and move it out to
the precinct and borough commands. He broke down a maze of bureaucratic
barriers-pushing, prodding, and (when necessary) replacing personnel. He was

able to integrate many of the police functions previously held by specialized units
to empower patrol officers to move directly to address drug and gun crimes in the
neighborhoods they serve.").

48.
Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and
Crime Control in New York, in Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America 191,
207-10 (Bernard Harcourt ed., 2003); Fagan, Street Stops, supra note 47, at 461-

63; Fagan & Davies, DrugEnforcement, supra note 35, at 37-38.
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Table 7. Poisson Regression of Non-Drug Felony Complaints
by Jail and Prison Admissions Within Police Precincts,
New York City, 1985-1996
Jail
t

p(t)

5.023
-0.084
0.450
1.516

1.89
-2.90
3.07
2.72

b
b
b

-1.302
-1.713
1.398
-0.319
-0.356
0.690
-0.140
-0.062
0.741

-0.54
-2.91
1.85
-1.19
-0.81
1.47
-0.55
-0.21
1.37

-0.002
-0.161

-120
2.62

0.015
0.019
-0.018
0.003
0.004
-0.004
-0.001
-0.001
-0.010

0.59
2.90
-1.12
0.53
1.31
-0.81
-0.31
-0.32
-1.65

Estimate
Intercept
Time
Residual (1985)
(Log) Jail Rate*
(Log) Prison Rate*
(Log) Homicide Rate
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Segregation
Social Control 1
Housing Structure
Social Control 1I
Immigration/Cultural Isolation
Human Capital II
Interactions with Time
Residual (1985)
(Log) Jail Rate*
(Log) Prison Rate*
(Log) Homicide Rate
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Social Control 1
Segregation
Housing Structure
Social Control II
Immigration/Cultural Isolation
Human Capital II
2 Log Likelihood
N=296

a = p<001, b = p<.O1, c = p<.05

* per 1000 population 15 and above

-235.3

b

b

b
c

Prison
t
p(t)

Exp(B)

Estimate

151.8
0.919
1.568
4.553

5.091
-0.085
0.410

2.28
-3.46
2.75

1.613
-0.078
-1.330
1.342
-1.306
-1.052
1.183
-0.105
-0.321
0.645

2.13
-0.03
-2.28
1.74
-1.14
-2.57
2.55
-0.41
-1.15
1.20

-0.001

-0.77

-0.017
0.002
0.014
-0.017
0.010
0.004
-0.009
-0.001
0.002
-0.009

-2.00
0.07
2.25
-2.01
2.20
1.27
-1.85
-0.44
0.57
-1.48

0.406
0.180
4.047
0.727
0.701
1.993
0.869
0.940
2.098

0.998
0.984
1.016
1.019
0.983
1.003
1.004
0.996
0.999
0.999
0.990

-257.3

a
b
c
c

b
b

Exp(B)
162
0.919
1.506
3.059
0.925
0.364
3.828
0.737
0.349
3.263
0.901
0.725
1.915

0.999
c
c
c
c

0.983
1.002
1.015
0.983
1.010
1.004
0.991
0.999
1.002
0.991
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Table 8. Poisson Regression of Non-Drug Felony Complaints
by Jail and Prison Admissions Within Neighborhoods,
New York City, 1985-1996
Jail
Estimate
Intercept
Time
Residual (1985)
Jail Rate*
Prison Rate*
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Social Control I
Segregation
Housing Structure
Social Control II
Immigration/Cultural
Isolation
Human Capital II
Interactions with Time
Residual (1985)
Jail Rate*
Prison Rate*
(Log) Drug Arrest Rate*
Poverty/Inequality
Social Control I
Segregation
Housing Structure
Social Control II
Immigration/Culturai
Isolation
Human Capital II
2 Log Likelihood
N=1096
a = p<001, b = p<.O1, c p<.05
* per 1000 population 15 and above

t

p(t)

Exp(B)

-1.579
-0.084
0.137
2.134

-0.39
-1.89
0.26
0.83

0.206
0.920
1.147
8.448

-0.876
0.232
1.084
-0.717
1.460
0.621
-0.577

-0.31
0.10
1.04
-0.67
0.92
1.54
-0.84

0.925

Estimate

Prison
t
p(t)

Exp(B)

-1.430
-0.085
0.103

-.035
-1.89
0.19

0.239
0.920
1.108

0.417
1.261
2.956
0.488
4.306
1.860
0.562

4.332
-0.979
0.657
0.696
-0.814
1.568
0.641
-0,575

1.10
-0.33
0.28
0.66
-0.77
0.98
1.59
-0.86

76.090
0.376
1.929
2.006
0.443
4.797
1.899
0.563

0.56

2.523

1.249

0.77

3.486

-0.2E4
-0.020

-0.00
-0.71

1.000
0.980

0.4E3

0.07

1.000

0.012
-0.4E3
-0.007
0.012
-0.017
-0.006
0.006

0.37
-0.01
-0.62
0.99
-0.96
-144
0.77

1.012
1.000
0.993
1.012
0.983
0.994
1.006

-0.045
0.013
-0.004
-0.003
0.013
-0.018
-0.007
0.006

-1.03
0.40
-0.17
-0.28
1.10
-1.01
-1.48
0.77

0.956
1.013
0.996
0.997
1.013
0.982
0.994
1.006

-0.010

-0,49

0.991

-0.012

-0.68

0.988

2896.3

2887.3
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Whether incarceration serves a deterrent or incapacitative
effect, we observe that crime is lower over time within precincts as
the incarceration admission rate grows. Second, the crime rate seems
to increase over time within precincts as the rate of drug arrests
increases, in separate models with jail and prison admissions as the
measure of incarceration effects. The conjunction of higher drug
arrests and lower incarceration rates to produce higher crime rates
suggests the perverse effects of policies that confound drug crimes
with other types of felony crimes. If incarceration is having a salutary
effect on crime in precincts, drug enforcement is exerting a quite
opposite and unhealthy effect, perhaps by diverting police attention
from felony crimes such as robbery or assault.
Neighborhoods. We find no significant predictors of homicide
victimization rates within neighborhoods. Recall that the crime
measure for neighborhoods is limited to homicide victimizations.
Accordingly, we are reluctant to conclude that these non-findings are
accurate, but are more likely a casualty of data limitations.
Summary: The Endogeneity of Incarceration

C.

Bursik and Grasmick's systemic theory of neighborhood and
49
crime regards social control as essential to regulating crime rates.
They carefully structured a dynamic theory of social control,
incorporating social ties and interactions among neighborhood
residents. 50 They view social control as the product of social
interactions among area residents, interactions that communicate
and enforce their collective social norms. In this framework, social
control is exerted not only by police and local residents, but also by
temporary residents including those entering neighborhoods for work
or visits. The latter group shares liability for their community,
though theirs is far more limited.
Bursik and Grasmick showed the interdependence of social
structure and social control, illustrating how the strains of everyday
life could compromise the participation of local residents in social
regulation. 51 Like many other social control theorists, however,
Bursik and Grasmick never envisioned that incarceration would be

49.

Bursik & Grasmick, supra note 37, at 12-18.

50.

Id. at 16-18.

51.

Id.
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an endogenous factor in social control, a factor that actually
compromised rather than strengthened the ability of neighbors to
form social ties and regulate social norms. Other commentators,
however, have done so, both empirically and theoretically. 52 For
example, Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush show that social
organization and social control are spatially embedded processes that
influence neighborhood-level variations in violence. 53 Thus, rising
and concentrated rates of incarceration not only become a part of the
fabric of poor communities, already susceptible to crime, but they
compromise the limited forms of social control that poor communities
can mount and enhance their vulnerability to crime. These dynamics
are discussed below.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE RECIPROCITY OF CRIME, LAW AND
INCARCERATION
The racial-spatial concentration of incarceration in
disadvantaged urban neighborhoods in New York accrued rapidly in
the late 1980s, and was sustained through the decade of the 1990s
even as crime rates fell by one half or more. As local incarceration
rates increased and concentrated spatially, incarceration and crime
became embedded in the social organization of neighborhoods like
54
Cesar's, the Bronx neighborhood described in Random Family.
Thus, the persistence and concentration of incarceration seem to be
products not of crime, but of the internalization of incarceration in
the ecology of many neighborhoods, and the endogeneity of drug
enforcement in the social organization and political economy of the
City's legal institutions. The effects of concentrated imprisonment
can be observed in the everyday lives of those directly affected-the
children and relatives of inmates, for example-but also vicariously
in the lives of their neighbors who intersect with the families of
inmates and parolees. When high incarceration rates are internalized
into the ecology of small, homogeneous neighborhoods, it adversely
affects their economic fortunes, political participation, family life, and
normative orientation.

52.
See, e.g., Rose & Clear, supra note 5.
53.
Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Equality, Collective Efficacy,
and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 Criminology 517 (2001).
54.
See LeBlanc, supra note 2.
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The spatial concentration of incarceration has grown more
acute in neighborhoods that already were socially and economically
disadvantaged, areas where non-whites were the dominant
population group. Analyses of incarceration trends in New York City
by neighborhood and police precinct suggest that the risks of going to
jail or prison seem to grow over time for persons living in these areas,
and their ability to address the social and economic dimensions that
contribute to incarceration diminishes as the size of the ex-inmate
population grows. Changes in law that narrowed judicial discretion
and structured sentencing toward mandated imprisonment ensured
that even a drastically smaller crime rate would produce a stable
flow of prison admissions.
distorts
of incarceration
concentration
The spatial
neighborhood social ecology and attenuates the neighborhood's
economic fortunes. The initial shock of spiking incarceration rates
transforms over time into an endogenous or internal neighborhood
characteristic that endures in defiance of a declining supply of
offenders. In fact, incarceration seems to provide a steady supply of
offenders for more incarceration through four mechanisms. The
interactions of these four mechanisms produce a multiplier effect
that further embeds incarceration into neighborhood life.
First, higher rates of incarceration invite heightened levels of
surveillance and policing, making detection of wrongdoing more
likely. By transforming neighborhoods into the subjects of
enforcement, the likelihood of incarcerative punishment increases as
a result of living in a stigmatized place. 55 Second, the declining
economic fortunes of residents further concentrate economic
disadvantage within persons and discourages local businesses from
locating in these areas. Beyond material deficits, the absence of local
economic activity deprives these areas of everyday economic
interactions that help regulate social interactions. Third, social
control is not sustainable when kinship networks are strained
materially to support children whose fathers are incarcerated, and
when marriage rates decline due to the absence7 of marriageable
males. Social control is compromised, and prospects for marriage or

Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken
55.
Windows Policing 88-89 (2001) (showing how elevated arrest rates are interpreted
by police and government officials as indicia of higher crime rates, inviting more
police surveillance that reifies the perception of higher crime rates).
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earning a living wage diminish, as neighborhood incarceration rates
rise.
Voter disenfranchisement of convicted felons creates a fourth
dynamic that adversely affects the political economy of
neighborhoods with high incarceration rates. 56 The inability to
influence political processes weakens leverage and access to
important services that can moderate the risks of crime, from
educational resources to trash removal and recreation. It is no secret
that incarceration policy is embedded in a political process that
benefits both corrections professionals and lawmakers. 57 While
lawmakers derive political benefits from sustaining high rates of
incarceration, the accumulation of disenfranchised voters in their
districts defangs putative re-election challenges. In this way,
disenfranchisement weakens political leverage over both state law
and local policies that might moderate the practices that intensify
incarceration patterns. These burdens weigh most heavily in
minority neighborhoods, where rates of excess incarceration are
further deprives residents of
highest. 58 Disenfranchisement
opportunities to engage in law through activities such as jury duty.
Citizens excluded from such basic elements of democracy as voting
and jury service may generalize their resentment toward resistance
to more common, everyday citizen-law interactions such as
cooperation in police investigations. 59 Finally, the racial-spatial
of incarceration intensifies racial residential
concentration
segregation, depressing real estate values and frustrating residents'
efforts to build capital through home ownership.
The social exclusion of America's correctional population
poses a challenge to democracy that demands political and social
56.
See Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisementand Voter Turnout, 33 J.
Legal Stud. 85 (2004) (showing that the large numbers of disenfranchised
African-American males biases estimates of their voting participation); see also
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? The Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisementin the United States, 67 Am. Soc. Rev.
777, 794-96 (2002) (demonstrating that felon disenfranchisement has altered the
outcomes of past U.S. Senate and presidential elections).
57.

See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (1999).

58.
See, e.g., Ryan S. King & Marc Maurer, The Vanishing Black Electorate:
(2004), available at
in Atlanta, Georgia
Disenfranchisement
Felony
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/atlanta-report.pdf (last visited Nov. 30,
2004).
59.

Fagan & Meares, supra note 10.
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attention. There has been no civic debate on the political and social
consequences of the production of incarceration, nor has there been
reflection on the laws and policies that sustain incarceration over
time and detach it from the social problems it was meant to address.
With nearly two million Americans under criminal justice
supervision, such a debate is long overdue and critical to the moral
and political health of the nation.
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APPENDIX

Figure 2a. Incarceration Rates by Police Precinct
New York City, 1985
1985 Rate of Incarceration - NYPD Precincts
persons> 15yearsold
Rateper 1,000
to prison)
(25%sampleof personssentenced

1985Prison Sentences(Quntles)
Sexcluded
-<O 57
M0.58- 1.15
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Figure 2b. Incarceration Rates by Police Precinct
New York City, 1990
1990 Rate of Incarceration - NYPD Precincts
Rateper 1,000persons> 15yearsold
(25%sampleofpersons sentencedto prison)

]990 Prison Smtemces(Quintiles)

exluded
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Figure 2c. Incarceration Rates by Police Precinct
New York City, 1996

1996 Rate of Incarceration - NYPD Precincts
Rateper 1,000persons> 15yearsold
(Z5%samnple
ofpesons sentencedto prison)
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Figure 3a. Incarceration Rates by Neighborhood
New York City, 1985
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Figure 3b. Incarceration Rates by Neighborhood
New York City, 1990

[36:71

2004]

NEIGHBORHOODAND INCARCERATION

Figure 3c. Incarceration Rates by Neighborhood
New York City, 1996

1996 Rate of Incarceration -- Neighborhoods
Rateper 1,000persons> 15yearsold
(25%sampleofpersonssentencedto pnson)

